We study CEO turnover -both internal (board driven) and external (through takeover and bankruptcy) -from 1992 to 2005 for a sample of large U.S. companies. Annual CEO turnover is higher than that estimated in previous studies over earlier periods. Turnover is 15.6% from 1992 to 2005, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than seven years. In the more recent period since 1998, total CEO turnover increases to 17.4%, implying an average tenure of less than six years. Internal turnover is significantly related to three components of firm stock performance -performance relative to industry, industry performance relative to the overall market, and the performance of the overall stock market. The relations are stronger in the more recent period since 1998. We find similar patterns for both forced and unforced turnover, suggesting that some turnover labeled as unforced is actually not voluntary. There is some evidence that the increases in turnover and turnover-performance sensitivity are related to increases in block shareholder ownership, board independence, and Sarbanes-Oxley. The increases in turnover are not related to shareholder rights or corporate fraud. External turnover is not significantly related to any of the measures of stock performance over the entire sample period, or over the two sub-periods.
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I. Introduction
In the last several years, corporate governance in the United States has come under great scrutiny, if not attack. The corporate governance scandals early in this decade led to the Sarbanes Oxley legislation. Since the legislation, the criticism of corporate governance has continued. CEOs are routinely criticized for being overpaid. Boards of directors are routinely criticized as cronies of those overpaid CEOs. Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) document the increase in CEO pay since the 1970s. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) document a substantial increase in CEO pay accelerated after 1995. All three papers criticize boards of directors for the increases in CEO pay and for not doing a good job monitoring the pay practices and CEOs.
While a great deal of work has focused on changes in CEO pay, recent changes in CEO turnover and board behavior have received little attention. Earlier work and casual empiricism suggest that the CEO's job has become riskier over time. Khurana (2003) reports that CEO turnover increased in the 1990s relative to the 1970s and 1980s. Murphy and Zabonjik (2004) and Jensen et al. (2004) also report that turnover has increased in the 1990s, although the magnitude they report is quite small -from 10% per year in the 1970s and 1980s to 11% in the 1990s. The samples in these papers do not go beyond the year 2000 so they are unable to consider the period in which corporate governance and CEO performance and pay have been subject to intense scrutiny.
In this paper, we study CEO turnover from 1992 to 2005 for a sample of large U.S.
companies. We consider turnover that occurs through takeover and bankruptcy as well as turnover in ongoing companies. When takeovers and bankruptcies are taken into consideration, the job of CEO in large U.S. companies appears more precarious than before, particularly after 1997. Annual CEO turnover is 15.6% from 1992 to 2005, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than seven years. In the more recent period since 1998, total CEO turnover increases to 17.4%, implying an average CEO turnover of just under six years. Internal or board driven turnover also rises substantially, increasing from 10.2% in the first part of the sample to 12.6% in the latter part of the sample. Looked at another way, only 36% of CEOs in place in 1992 remained CEO in 1997, while only 25% of CEOs in place in 1998 remained CEO in 2003.
We then look at how turnover varies with firm performance. Previous work suggests a modest relation between internal (board initiated) turnover and firm stock performance. (See Murphy (1999) and Jensen et al. (2004) ). We find a stronger and significant relation between internal turnover and firm stock performance. Internal turnover is related to three different components of total firm stock performance. I.e., turnover is sensitive to the stock performance of the firm relative to the industry, the stock performance of the industry relative to the stock market (under certain specifications), and the performance of the overall stock market. (Jenter and Kanaan (forthcoming) obtain similar results for forced turnover which we discuss below.)
The sensitivity to one standard deviation differences in each of these measures is economically meaningful. We find similar results for both forced and unforced turnover.
Further, internal turnover after 1997 is more strongly related to all three measures of stock performance. In fact, the sensitivity to stock performance appears to be greater than that in any of the periods between 1970 and 1995 studied in Murphy (1999) . Ironically, it appears that during the period in which boards have been criticized, boards have become increasingly sensitive to firm stock performance.
We next consider five possible explanations for or factors that drive the changes in turnover and turnover-performance sensitivity. There is some evidence that the increases in turnover and turnover-performance sensitivity are related to increases in blockholdings, board independence, and Sarbanes-Oxley, but not to the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) governance index or to corporate fraud.
External turnover -turnover primarily related to acquisitions -is only significantly related to industry performance relative to the market. This result is economically small and driven by the later sub-period.
As we discuss in more detail in the conclusion, our results suggest a number of implications. First, the results indicate that CEO tenures have declined, suggesting the job is more precarious than in the past. When external takeovers are included, the average tenure of a CEO has declined to less than six years for the recent 1998 to 2005 period. The recent tenures are substantially shorter than those reported in previous work for the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. For individual CEOs, the shorter expected tenure likely offsets some of the benefit of the increase in CEO pay over this period.
Second, our similar results for the turnover-performance sensitivities of forced and unforced turnover suggest that a number of turnovers labeled as unforced are, in fact, not voluntary.
Third, the results suggest an evolving role for boards. In a sample from the 1980s, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) find that internal turnover is related to industry-adjusted performance while external turnover from hostile takeovers is related to industry performance.
They interpret this as indicating boards respond well to poor performance relative to the industry, but do not respond well to poor industry performance. The external takeover market becomes active in reaction to poor industry performance and a need for restructuring.
Our results suggest that boards respond not only to poor performance relative to the industry, but also to poor industry performance and to poor market performance. One interpretation of these results is that boards (perhaps in concert with shareholders) perform both the role they performed in the 1980s and the role that hostile takeovers played then. The increased turnover associated with blockholdings, board independence, and Sarbanes-Oxley is consistent with this interpretation.
Fourth, the shorter expected CEO tenures and sensitivity of those tenures to stock performance have implications for the measurement of CEO pay. The shorter expected tenures suggest that the estimates of CEO pay used in most compensation studies are overstated.
Finally, shorter CEO tenures, the greater sensitivity to stock performance, as well as higher CEO pay may have created a greater incentive for CEOs to engage in earnings management or manipulation.
This paper was written contemporaneously with Jenter and Kanaan (forthcoming) who study related issues in a sample of CEO turnover from 1993 to 2001. They focus on forced CEO turnover, rather than all CEO turnover. Forced turnovers represent somewhere between 15% and 25% of total internal turnovers. As we do for forced and unforced turnover, they find that forced CEO turnover is significantly related to industry-adjusted, industry, and market returns. They focus most of their paper on verifying this effect for forced turnover and explaining why boards might behave this way. They also study a larger sample of firms, but over a shorter time period.
Unlike us, they do not focus on the level of total turnover, the annual variation in that turnover, and do not consider external turnovers. Given their shorter sample, they also do not consider how turnover behavior changes over time.
Our paper also is related to that of Mikkelson and Partch (1997) who compare complete management turnover in US companies in two five-year periods -the active takeover market of 1984 -1988 and the less active market of 1989-1993. In the active takeover period, they find that 39% of firms experience CEO turnover and 23% of firms experience complete management turnover; in the less active period, 34% of firms experience CEO turnover while 16% of firms experience complete management turnover. They find that the decline in turnover frequency is more pronounced among poorly performing firms. They argue that the activity of the external takeover market affects the "intensity of management discipline." Our results suggest that the intensity of management discipline has increased since the end of their sample period, and likely exceeds the intensity of the active takeover period. Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) also examine CEO turnover across sub-periods to see if the relation between performance and turnover has changed over time. Using four six-year sub-periods between 1971 to 1994, they document that while CEO turnover is negatively related to accounting performance and industryadjusted stock returns, the relations did not change significantly over time. Our analysis begins at the end of their sample period and shows that, at least, during the 1992 to 2005 period the relation between turnover and performance has changed.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes our sample. Section III presents the results for turnover levels. Section IV presents the turnover-performance regressions. Section V summarizes the results and discusses their implications in more detail.
II. Sample and Data
The sample of firms includes all Fortune 500 firms with data on both the Center for We follow the sample firms from the first year they appear on a Fortune list until the end of the sample period or until the firm exits the sample because of a merger, acquisition or delisting from a major stock exchange. We identify CEO turnovers using the Fortune 500 and Fortune 1000 lists, 10-K filings, proxy statements, Dun and Bradstreet's Million Dollar Directory, the Wall Street Journal and Lexis/Nexis business news searches.
III. Turnover Levels
Turnover in a given fiscal year, T, means that the CEO in the spring of year T is no longer the CEO by the following spring of year T+1. We measure turnover, therefore in the years 1992 to 2005.
We consider two types of turnover. Standard or internal turnover is turnover that is associated with a company's board of directors. For standard turnover, a company remains publicly-listed over the course of the year, but the CEO in the spring is no longer the CEO the following spring. This is the turnover that is generally measured in studies of turnover. For example, see Huson et al. (2001) . Non-standard or external turnover is turnover due to a merger or bankruptcy / delisting. We also consider the CEO to have been turned over if his or her company is taken over by another company and he or she is not CEO of the combined company.
We view this as an instance of turnover because in many mergers the former CEO leaves the combined company. In those instances in which the CEO former remains, the former CEO generally experiences a reduction in pay and power. Total turnover is the sum of internal and external turnover. for all firms in our sample. Panels B1 and B2 report turnover statistics based on whether the sample firm is in the Fortune 500 in a given year or not. Panels C1 and C2 report turnover statistics based on whether the sample firm is in the S&P 500 in a given year or not.
For total turnover and standard turnover we use two definitions of turnover. Definition
(1) defines a turnover occurrence if a new CEO is selected. Definition (2) defines a turnover occurrence in which the CEO dies as a non-turnover event. Figure 1 presents total and standard turnover for all firms according to definition (1) graphically.
There are three noteworthy patterns across the panels. First, total turnover levels are substantially higher than those typically reported. Overall, total turnover in Panel A under definition (1) is 15.6% over the entire sample period implying an average CEO tenure of 6.4
years. This is substantially higher than that reported in Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) and Murphy and Zabonjik (2004) who study a different sample of large firms (from the Forbes lists) over three decades from 1970 to 2000. They report turnover of 10.2% in the 1970s, 10.0% in the 1980s, and 11.3% in the 1990s. All of these measures, however, are for standard or internal turnover. For our sample period of 1992 to 2005, we obtain a standard turnover of 11.6%, similar to their results for the 1990s. At 11.6%, the estimated average CEO tenure is 8.6 years, roughly two years greater than the actual average tenure (that includes external takeover).
The second noteworthy pattern in table 1 is the time series variation in the levels of both total and internal turnover. For example, in Panel A and using definition (1) total turnover is as low as 6.9% in 2003 (and only 9.2% in 1994) , and as high as 26% in 2000 (and 21.2% in 1999) .
Third, turnover increased significantly in the latter part of the sample. In the earlier period from 1992 to 1997, total CEO turnover using definition (1) in Panel A is 13.0% per year implying an average tenure of 7.7 years. In the more recent period from 1998 to 2005, total CEO turnover increases to 17.4%, implying an average CEO turnover of 5.8 years. Internal or board driven turnover also rises substantially, increasing from 10.2% in the first part of the sample to 12.6% in the latter part of the sample. The increase in turnover is driven by very high levels of turnover from 1998 to 2002 and in 2005.
It is natural to divide the sample period into pre-1998 and post-1997 because this break roughly coincides with the large increase in CEO pay described in Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) . 1 The period in which CEO pay increased substantially coincides with a period in which CEO tenure decreases substantially. It is worth adding that the increased level of turnover began well before 2002 (when the Enron and Worldcom scandals became apparent and Sarbanes-Oxley was passed).
It is possible that our results are affected by our sample selection criteria. We continue to follow a firm once it is included in the Fortune 500, even if it drops from the Fortune 500. This may make our results harder to compare with other studies that restrict themselves to firms in the Fortune 500, S&P 500 or Forbes lists. Accordingly panels B1 and B2 consider turnover separately for firms in the Fortune 500 and those not in the Fortune 500 in the particular year, while panels C1 and C2 do the analogous comparison for firms in and not in the S&P 500.
Panels B1 and B2 indicate that both total and standard turnover are higher for firms in the Fortune 500 than for firms not in the Fortune 500. Total and internal turnover over the sample period are, respectively, 16.3% and 12.8% for Fortune 500 companies compared to 14.0% and 9.1% for the non-Fortune 500 companies.
The increase in turnover from the earlier part of the sample to the latter part of the sample is consistent across both Fortune 500 and non-Fortune 500 companies.
Panels C1 and C2 consider turnover separately for firms in and not in the S&P 500. Total turnover is similar for the two groups while internal turnover is greater for the companies in the S&P 500. Again, turnover increases from the earlier part of the sample to the latter part of the sample for both groups. The increase is somewhat greater for non-S&P 500 firms.
The results for the Fortune 500 and S&P 500 firms, therefore, indicate that the three patterns in our overall sample are not sensitive to our selection criteria. 
IV. The Relation of Turnover and Performance
A. Internal Turnover
We estimate pooled annual probit regressions to examine the likelihood of internal CEO turnover. In all of the probit regressions, the dependent variable is equal to one if a CEO turns over and zero otherwise. Turnover is measured using definition (2) (i.e., deaths are coded as non-turnover events). The tables report the marginal changes in the probability of internal CEO turnover, implied by the probit coefficient estimates that result from a unit change in the explanatory variables. For indicator variables, the coefficient represents the change in the probability associated with moving the indicator from 0 to 1. These marginal sensitivities, labeled " Prob," are economically equivalent to coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares estimation. In the discussion below, we focus on the significance of these marginal effects.
Standard errors are robust.
In all of the probit regressions, three proxies are used to measure stock market performance. First, we measure market performance using the annual return on the S&P 500 index. Second, relative industry performance is measured at the two-digit SIC code level and equals the difference between the return on the median firm in the industry and the return on the S&P 500 index. Third, relative firm performance is measured as the industry-adjusted firm stock return, which is equal to the firm stock return minus the return for the median firm in the same Second, CEO turnover also is related to poor industry performance. Again, the negative relation for the full sample period appears to be driven by the second sub-period. For the 1998 to 2005 sub-period, a one-standard deviation (22.5%) decline in industry performance is associated with a 2.1% increase in the likelihood of CEO turnover.
Third, lower overall market performance, as measured by the return on the S&P 500 index, is also associated with a higher likelihood of internal CEO turnover for the full sample and the 1998 to 2005 sub-period. For the second sub-period a one-standard deviation (18%) decline in the S&P 500 index corresponds to an increase of 3.0% in CEO turnover likelihood.
Surprisingly, the relations between CEO turnover and overall market performance, and industry performance, respectively are positive and significant in the 1992 to 1997 sub-period.
One possible interpretation for these positive marginal probabilities is that CEOs left office after good performance. This would be the case if they were voluntary turnovers. While forced turnovers increased from the 1992 to 1997 sub-period to the latter subperiod (from 12.4% to 17.9%), this explanation is implausible because the great majority of turnovers in both subperiods are classified as voluntary.
Overall, the results in the first set of regressions indicate that the relation between internal CEO turnover and (poor) stock market performance appears to have intensified after 1997. All three sensitivities to stock performance -3.4%, 2.1%, and 1.8%, respectively, for one standard deviation changes in industry-adjusted, industry, and market performance -are economically meaningful relative to average internal turnover of 12.6% from 1998 to 2005.
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The second set of regressions in table 4 includes the change in return on assets ( period. For the entire period, internal CEO turnover is significantly negatively related to industry-adjusted and overall market stock performance in the current year. Turnover also is significantly negatively related to industry-adjusted and industry performance stock performance in the previous year. Strangely, turnover is significantly positively related to the lagged return on the S&P 500 (although the positive coefficient on the lagged return is smaller in magnitude than the negative coefficient on the contemporaneous return).
As in the previous results, the regressions in table 5 indicate that the turnoverperformance relations are driven by the later sub-period. During the later sub-period, internal CEO turnover is significantly negatively related to industry-adjusted stock performance in the current year and previous year, and significantly negatively related to industry stock performance in the current year. Turnover is negatively related to the overall stock market return in the for industry -adjusted stock performance is less negative in the earlier period than in the later period.
The regressions that include current and lagged change in ROA indicate that boards are sensitive to current changes in operating performance in the full period and later sub-periods.
However, a one standard deviation change in the change in ROA is associated with a smaller increase in CEO turnover than a one standard deviation change in the stock market performance.
The differences in responsiveness to stock performance over the two sub-periods remain with the exception that current industry performance is not significantly related to CEO turnover in the 1998 to 2005 sub-period.
Overall, the results in tables 4 and 5 suggest that since 1997, boards have been more sensitive to poor stock performance. It is also worth noting that the economic magnitudes of the effect are large. For the 1998 to 2005 period, the first set of regressions imply that a CEO whose firm performs one standard deviation better than the industry has a cumulative 5.2% lower likelihood of turnover while a CEO whose firm performs one standard deviation worse than the industry has a cumulative 5.2% increase in the likelihood of turnover. From a base turnover level of 12.6%, these imply likelihoods of 7.4% for the strong performer versus 17.8% for the poor performer. These are economically meaningful differences with 7.4% implying a tenure of 13.5 years and 17.8% implying a tenure of 5.6 years.
In table 6, we report probit regressions of CEO turnover on two-year measures of performance. In panel A, performance is measured over two calendar years (current and lagged). In panel B, performance is measured as the average of current and lagged values. firms. Second, investors may be more likely to pay attention to firms in the S&P 500 index, and, if so, these firms would be more likely to be monitored by the press and institutional investors.
Thus, the effect of stock market performance might be different for these firms (Bertrand and Mullanianathan, 2001 ).
The coefficient patterns in table 7 are qualitatively similar for the two sets of firms.
Turnover in both sets of firms is significantly related to industry-adjusted and market stock performance over the entire sample period. As in the sample overall, the relations are stronger in the more recent 1998 to 2005 period.
B. Internal Turnover and Governance Variables
The previous sections document an increase in CEO turnover and turnover-performance sensitivity for large public companies in the U.S. In this section we consider five possible sources of those increases -corporate governance (or shareholder rights), shareholder blockholdings, board independence, the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) legislation, and fraud.
Recent work has suggested that differences in corporate governance and shareholder rights may have real effects. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) find that differences in corporate governance and shareholder rights are related to stock returns. Masulis, Wang, and
Xie (2005) find that those differences in corporate governance are related to acquisition behavior. In both papers, greater shareholder rights are associated with higher stock returns.
In this section, we examine the relation between turnover, stock performance and governance. To do so, we use the GIM index developed by Gompers et al. (2003) . They categorize 24 charter provisions, bylaw provisions, and other firm-level rules associated with corporate governance into five types: (1) Tactics for delaying hostile bidders, (2) voting rights, (3) director/officer protection, (4) other takeover defenses, and (5) state laws. Their overall index and the five component indices generally score one point for each provision that restricts shareholder rights or increases managerial power. Thus, a higher index score represents greater managerial power (weaker shareholder rights).
We estimated turnover regressions that interact stock performance with the measure of governance. We used both a continuous measure of the GIM index as well as a dummy variable if the firm's GIM index was in the highest quintile. To the extent that the GIM index measures poor governance, the GIM index should have a negative effect on the level of turnover (i.e., poorly governed firms should have less turnover), while the interaction of the GIM index and stock performance should have a positive effect on turnover (i.e., turnover at poorly governed firms should be less sensitive to poor performance). Table 8 presents our results for regressions using the dummy variable for the highest GIM index quintile. For the full sample period and the 1992 to 1997 sub-period, the marginal probability associated with the GIM index is positive and marginally significant. I.e., a high GIM index (fewer shareholder rights) is associated with slightly higher CEO turnover, not less.
For the sample overall and for each sub-period, most of the interaction terms are not statistically different from zero. For two coefficients, the GIM index interaction is significantly negative. Turnover is significantly more sensitive to poor lagged industry-adjusted performance for the high GIM index firms during the overall sample period and in the 1998 to 2005 subperiod. These are the opposite signs one would expect if the GIM index measured poor governance. On the other hand, the GIM index interaction is significantly positive for current year industry-adjusted performance in the 1998 to 2005 period. When the current and lagged coefficients on industry-adjusted performance are added, in both the overall and 1998 to 2005 sub-periods, the net effect of the interaction terms for the two years is to be insignificantly negatively related to industry-adjusted performance.
Although not reported in a table, our results also are qualitatively similar when we interact stock performance with the continuous measure of the GIM index.
Overall, then, we interpret these results as finding that the GIM measures of governance or shareholder rights do not have an appreciable relation to or impact on CEO turnover. The most one can say is that the GIM measure is possibly associated with a somewhat faster response to poor industry-adjusted performance. Our results are consistent with a contemporaneous paper by Bhagat and Bolton (2006) who also fail to find a significant effect on turnover when they interact governance and performance.
Next we consider the effect of blockholder ownership. Institutional and blockholder ownership have increased over the sample period. We focus on blockholder ownership (where an institution owns at least 5% of a firm's outstanding shares) because blockholders have both the incentive and the ability to monitor. Cremers and Nair (2005) find that blockholder ownership and governance affect corporate valuations in certain circumstances. In this section, we examine the relation between CEO turnover and block ownership.
We follow Cremers and Nair (2005) and use the percentage of shares held in each firm by the firm's largest institutional blockholder where blockholders are shareholders with greater than 5% ownership of the firm's outstanding shares. They construct their measure using data from CDA Spectrum that is based on quarterly SEC 13F filing by institutional shareholders. (We thank Martijn Cremers for making the data available to us.) Table 9 reports the mean and median block ownership and the presence of a blockholder for our sample firms. The average holding of blockholders and fraction of firms with a blockholder present increase over the sample period. During the 1992 to 1997 sub-period, the average blockholder ownership is 10.9% while 67% of the firms have a blockholder present.
During the 1998 to 2005 sub-period, blockholder ownership averages 14.5% while almost 77%
of the firms have a blockholder present. The differences across sub-periods are statistically significant.
In table 10, we report the results of probit turnover regressions that include the percent of total blockholder ownership (at the end of the previous year). We report two probit regression specifications. In first specification, we include only the continuous measure. In the second specification, we also interact the continuous measures and our three stock performance measures.
In the first set of regressions, blockholder ownership is positively and significantly related to CEO turnover for the full sample and both sub-periods. A one standard deviation increase in blockholder ownership during the full period (0.1241) implies a 1.2% increase in probability of CEO turnover. The coefficient is higher, but not significantly so, in the earlier sub-sample. The turnover-performance sensitivities are qualitatively similar to those in the earlier regressions. This result is consistent with a role for institutional blockholders, on average, in the increase in CEO turnover over the sample period.
In the second set of regressions in table 10, we also include interaction terms. When we do, the coefficient on block ownership is no longer statistically significant. The interaction terms tend to be positive for industry stock return and market return, but negative for industry-adjusted stock returns. One interpretation of this result is that blockholders are particularly active in firms that underperform their industries.
The results for blockholders, therefore, are suggestive of blockholders playing a role in the increase in CEO turnover and, the increase in industry-adjusted turnover-performance We obtain data on director independence from the IRRC Directors database on WRDS.
We use the variable director type to classify directors as independent. The variable can take on three values, E for employee, L for linked (affiliated) or I for independent. The IRRC data are available only from 1996 to 2004. Table 9 reports the percent of independent directors, and the fraction of firms that do not have a majority independent board. Similar to the rise in blockholders, the percent of independent directors on a firm's board increases over time. The percentage increases from 63% to almost 69% from the earlier period to the later period. Moreover, the fraction of firms without a majority independent board decreases from 26% during the 1992 to 1997 sub-period to 16% in the 1998 to 2005 sub-period.
In table 11, we report the results of probit turnover that account for board independence.
We include a dummy variable that equals one if the firm does not have a majority independent board. (The baseline, therefore, is a firm that does have a majority independent board.) The results are qualitatively similar, but have a less natural interpretation when we use the percentage of independent directors. We also interact this indicator variable with the stock performance variables. We estimate the probit for the 1997 to 2005 period, the period over which we have lagged director data.
When we do not include interaction effects with performance, Table 11 indicates that the marginal probability associated with the no independent board indicator variable is insignificant.
When we include the interaction effects with performance in the second regression, there is a 3.8% lower probability of CEO turnover for a firm without an independent board. At the same time, five of the six interaction terms are positive suggesting that non-independent boards are also associated with less turnover-performance sensitivity. With the exception of the lagged stock market return, however, none of the interaction terms are statistically different from zero.
Said another way, the results of the second regression suggest that more independent boards are associated with more turnover and (although less statistically reliably) more turnover sensitivity to poor performance.
In In the first regression, CEO turnover is significantly higher during years under the SOX legislation. The marginal positive marginal probability implies a 3.0% percent increase in turnover during these years. Additionally, the interaction term between the SOX indicator variable and market performance is significantly negative implying a decrease in market performance in associated with higher turnover during the years under the SOX legislation.
When we add the lagged variables, the marginal probability associated with the SOX indicator variable is positive but only marginally statistically significant in the 1998 to 2005 sub-period.
The interaction term with current market performance remains negative and significantly significant for the full sample but not the 1998 to 2005 sub-period sample. For the 1998 to 2005 sub-period, the interaction term between the indicator variable and lagged market performance is negative and significant but the sum of the lagged market performance and lagged interaction term is not statistically different from zero.
Overall, these results suggest some increase in turnover associated with the SOX legislation.
Finally, it is possible that our results are driven by firms involved in scandals. To examine whether this is the case, we exclude all firm-years classified as scandal firm years by Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2006a and 2006b) . The results are qualitatively identical to our basic results. Accordingly, we do not report them separately in a table.
C. Forced Turnover
Thus far, we have not distinguished between forced turnover and all other turnover.
Jenter and Kanaan (2006) focus exclusively on forced turnover. As we do for all turnover, they find that forced turnover is related to the three different measures of performance. It is possible that our results are driven by the forced turnover in our sample. To examine whether this is the case and whether performance is related differently to forced turnover and standard internal turnover, we estimate multinomial logit (MNL) regressions.
We follow Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001) Over the entire sample period, internal turnover is 11.60% per year. Forced turnover is 1.84% while unforced turnover is 9.70%. 3 Identifiably forced turnover, therefore, is infrequent relative to all internal turnover.
We present the regression results in table 13. The dependent variable categories in the MNL estimations are unforced turnover, forced turnover, or no turnover. The table reports the marginal effect of each regressor and the associated probability value (p-value) of the test that the marginal probability is equal to zero based on asymptotic standard errors.
The probability of forced turnover is significantly negatively related to the three components of firm stock performance -firm performance relative to the industry, the industry relative to the market, and the overall market -in the current year and to industry-adjusted return in the previous year. The probability of unforced turnover is significantly negatively related to firm stock performance relative to the industry and the overall market in the current year, and to industry stock return and industry-adjusted stock return in the previous year. As in the previous results, both type of turnover are positively related to lagged market performance.
Overall, then, both forced turnover and unforced turnover are sensitive to all three types of poor stock performance. This suggests that a number of unforced turnovers are not voluntary.
D. External Turnover
As discussed earlier, in addition to internal turnover, we examine external turnover.
Recall, non-standard or external turnover is turnover due to a merger or bankruptcy / delisting.
We consider the CEO to have been turned over in a merger if his or her company is taken over by another company and he or she is not CEO of the combined company. We consider the CEO to have been turned over in a bankruptcy if he or she is no longer CEO of the bankrupt company.
The incidence of external turnover is 4.5% per year over the sample period. Table 14 reports probit regressions of the probability of external turnover as a function of stock market performance and accounting performance. As in tables 4 and 5, we report the results with and without the change in accounting performance. We do not include current year performance because firms are taken over or delisted in the current year. Table 14 shows that external turnover is only related to industry stock performance over the entire sample period and for the 1998 to 2005 sub-period when we exclude the change in operating performance. When we include the change in operating performance, turnover is negatively related to industry stock performance relative to the market and positively related to the change in ROA. Even in this case, the marginal probabilities are economically small. For example, a one standard deviation decline in industry stock performance over the sample period (1992 to 2005) increases the probability of an external turnover by 0.2%.
The results for external turnover and performance suggest that, on average, takeovers during this period were not disciplinary in nature.
V. Summary and Implications
In this paper, we examine the extent and determinants of internal and external CEO turnover for a sample of large U.S. companies from 1992 to 2005. Total turnover, the sum of internal and external turnover, is 15.6% from 1992 to 2005, implying an average CEO tenure of less than seven years. In the more recent period from 1998 to 2005, total CEO turnover increases to 17.4%, implying an average tenure of less than six years. Internal or board driven turnover also rises substantially in the latter part of the sample.
We then look at how turnover varies with firm stock performance. Previous work suggests a modest relation between internal (board initiated) turnover and firm stock performance. We find a stronger and significant relation between internal turnover and three different components of firm stock performance -performance relative to the industry, performance of the industry relative to the stock market, and the performance of the overall stock market. (Jenter and Kanaan (forthcoming) obtain similar results.) The sensitivities are economically meaningful. Both types of internal turnover -forced and unforced are sensitive to all three types of poor stock performance.
Internal turnover after 1997 is more strongly related to all three measures of stock performance. In fact, the sensitivity to stock performance appears to be greater than that in any of the periods between 1970 and 1995 studied in Murphy (1999).
We next consider five possible explanations for or factors that drive the changes in turnover and turnover-performance sensitivity. There is some evidence that the increases in turnover and turnover-performance sensitivity are related to increases in blockholdings, board independence, and Sarbanes-Oxley. Turnover and turnover-performance sensitivity are not reliably related to the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) governance index or to corporate fraud.
Our results have several implications. First, they suggest that the CEO job is more precarious than in the past. When external takeovers are included, the average tenure of a CEO has declined to less than six years for the recent 1998 to 2005 period. The recent tenures are substantially shorter than those reported in previous work for the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. The shorter tenures appear to have continued out of sample. In preliminary work, we find that total CEO turnover in our sample firms is roughly 17% in 2006 and 2007.
For individual CEOs, the shorter expected tenure likely offsets some of the benefit of the increase in CEO pay since the mid-1990s. For example, the annual pay of S&P 500 CEOs roughly doubled in real terms from the 1992 -1997 period to the 1998 -2005 period. Our estimates suggest that the total pay of an individual CEO over his or her entire expected term increased by less than this because the expected tenure at the higher pay declined by one-quarter to one-third.
This calculation would be inaccurate if severance agreements around internal turnover and takeovers are both large and have increased over time. If, instead, the severance agreements are small, then they do not have much of an effect on a CEOs total pay. Yermack (2006) and Hartzell et al. (2004) study severance agreements, respectively, around internal and external takeover events. In fact, the average and median magnitudes they report are modest. (They do not study whether these payments have changed over time.) Severance agreements, therefore, are unlikely to alter the conclusion that the job of CEO has become riskier and that the shorter expected tenures of CEOs partially offset increases in CEO pay.
Second, our similar results for the turnover-performance sensitivities of forced and unforced turnover suggest that a number of unforced turnovers are not voluntary.
Third, our results also suggest an evolving role for boards. In a sample from the 1980s, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) find that internal turnover is related to industry-adjusted performance while external turnover from hostile takeovers is related to industry performance.
Our results suggest that boards respond not only to poor performance relative to the industry, but also to poor industry performance and to poor market performance. To the extent that internal turnover has increased, boards also appear to monitor more frequently. One interpretation of these results is that boards -possibly encouraged by large shareholdersperform both the role they performed in the 1980s and the role that hostile takeovers played then. has an expected initial tenure of six years, the ExecuComp assumption will tend to overstate the value of option grants every year of the CEO's tenure with the overstatement increasing each year. This assumes that CEOs forfeit unvested options and / or must exercise vested options when they leave the company. For internal turnover, Yermack (2006) finds that this tends to be the default policy for most companies and companies deviate from those policies in only 16% of the internal turnovers he studies. ExecuComp also values restricted stock grants as fully vested when, in fact, they usually vest over a period of time. This also will tend to overstate executive compensation.
The sensitivity of turnover to performance implies that the vesting and effective life of stock options are not independent of performance. The options of CEOs of companies that perform poorly will both have a shorter effective life and will be worth less. The Black-Scholes methodology does not take these correlations into account. This, in turn, implies that a proper valuation of stock options -e.g., using a binomial tree approach -would incorporate these correlations.
Finally, shorter CEO tenures, the greater sensitivity to stock performance, as well as higher CEO pay may have created a greater incentive for CEOs to engage in earnings management or manipulation. Total turnover is all CEO turnover including turnover due to mergers and acquisitions and delistings from a major stock exchange. Standard (internal) turnover excludes turnover due to mergers and acquisitions and delistings from a major stock exchange. For total and standard turnover, turnover is measured in two ways: (1) and (2). (1) Figure 1 CEO turnovers in publicly traded Fortune 500 companies between 1992 and year-end 2005. Total turnover is all CEO turnover including turnover due to mergers and acquisitions and delistings from a major stock exchange. Standard (internal) turnover excludes turnover due to mergers and acquisitions and delistings from a major stock exchange. For total and standard turnover, turnover is measured using method (1), which defines turnover if a new CEO is selected. Probit regression estimates of the likelihood of CEO turnover during the period from 1992 to 2005 to test whether the probability of turnover is higher in the 1998 to 2005 period. Total turnover is all CEO turnover including turnover due to mergers and acquisitions and delistings from a major stock exchange. Standard (internal) turnover excludes turnover due to mergers and acquisitions and delistings from a major stock exchange. For total and standard turnover, turnover is measured in two ways: (1) and (2). (1) defines a turnover occurrence if a new CEO is selected. (2) defines occurrences where the CEO dies in office as a non-turnover event. The dependent variable equals one if the CEO turnovers and zero otherwise. Prob represents the change in the probability associated with moving the indicator from 0 to 1. Year 9805 indicator variable equals one if year is greater than or equal to 1998 and zero otherwise. Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity. p-values are in parentheses. *** indicate significance at the 1% level.
Total Turnover Standard (Internal) Turnover Table 3 . CEO turnover
Number and percent of firms experiencing no turnover over a five-year period. Turnover is measured using total turnover. Total turnover is all CEO turnover including turnover due to mergers and acquisitions and delistings from a major stock exchange. Occurrences where the CEO dies in office is defined as a non-turnover event.
Year 1992
Number of firms in the sample in 1992 464
Number of firms experiencing no turnover between 1992 and 1997 166
Percent of firms experiencing no turnover between 1992 and 1997 35.77%
Year 1998
Number of firms in the sample in 1998 723
Number of firms experiencing no turnover between 1998 and 2003 178
Percent of firms experiencing no turnover between 1998 and 2003 24.62% Table 4 . Probit regressions of the probability of internal CEO turnover on performance Probit regression estimates of the likelihood of internal CEO turnover during the period from 1992 to 2005. Internal turnover excludes turnover due to mergers and acquisitions and delistings from a major stock exchange. Occurrences where the CEO dies in office are defined as non-turnover events. The dependent variable equals one if the CEO turnovers and zero otherwise. Prob measures the change in the probability of CEO turnover per unit change in the relevant explanatory variables. For indicator variables, the coefficient represents the change in the probability associated with moving the indicator from 0 to 1. Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity. CEO age dummy equals 1 if lagged CEO age is greater than or equal to 60 and zero otherwise. p-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. . Table 5 . Probit regressions of the probability of internal CEO turnover on performance and lagged performance
Probit regression estimates of the likelihood of internal CEO turnover during the period from 1992 to 2005. Internal turnover excludes turnover due to mergers and acquisitions and delistings from a major stock exchange. Occurrences where the CEO dies in office are defined as non-turnover events. The dependent variable equals one if the CEO turnovers and zero otherwise. ΔProb measures the change in the probability of CEO turnover per unit change in the relevant explanatory variables. For indicator variables, the coefficient represents the change in the probability associated with moving the indicator from 0 to 1. Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity. CEO age dummy equals 1 if lagged CEO age is greater than or equal to 60 and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. p-values are in parentheses. Table 7 . Probit regressions of relation of internal CEO turnover and performance for Fortune 500 firms in and not in the S&P 500 Index
Probit regression estimates of the likelihood of internal CEO turnover for Fortune 500 firms during the period from 1992 to 2005. Internal turnover excludes turnover due to mergers and acquisitions and delistings from a major stock exchange. Occurrences where the CEO is promoted to another CEO position, remains CEO of the delisting firm, is selected for a government position, dies in office, or leaves office due to illness are defined as non-turnover events. Firms are divided into those in the S&P 500 index and those not in the index. The dependent variable equals one if the CEO turnovers and zero otherwise. ΔProb measures the change in the probability of CEO turnover per unit change in the relevant explanatory variables. For indicator variables, the coefficient represents the change in the probability associated with moving the indicator from 0 to 1. Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity. CEO age dummy equals 1 if lagged CEO age is greater than or equal to 60 and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. p-values are in parentheses. Full Sample 1992 -1997 1998 -2005 In S&P 500 Index All other firms
In S&P 500 Index All other firms
In S&P 500 Index All other firms Internal turnover excludes turnover due to mergers and acquisitions and delistings from a major stock exchange. Occurrences where the CEO dies in office are defined as non-turnover events. The dependent variable equals one if the CEO turnovers and zero otherwise. ΔProb measures the change in the probability of CEO turnover per unit change in the relevant explanatory variables. For indicator variables, the coefficient represents the change in the probability associated with moving the indicator from 0 to 1. Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity. CEO age dummy equals 1 if lagged CEO age is greater than or equal to 60 and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. p-values are in parentheses. 1992 -1997 1998 -2005 Variable Cremers and Nair (2005) . ΔProb measures the change in the probability of CEO turnover per unit change in the relevant explanatory variables. For indicator variables, the coefficient represents the change in the probability associated with moving the indicator from 0 to 1. Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity. CEO age dummy equals 1 if lagged CEO age is greater than or equal to 60 and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. p-values are in parentheses. 1992 -1997 1992 -1997 1998 -2005 1998 -2005 Variable 1992 -1997 1992 -1997 1998 -2005 1998 -2005 Variable
Full Sample
ΔProb (p-value) ΔProb (p-value) ΔProb (p-
Full Sample Full Sample
Lagged percent of total block ownership x(Industry-adjusted stock return) Internal turnover excludes turnover due to mergers and acquisitions and delistings from a major stock exchange. Occurrences where the CEO dies in office are defined as non-turnover events. The dependent variable equals one if the CEO turnovers and zero otherwise. Independent director data are taken from IRRC Directors database on WRDS. No independent board equals one if a majority of directors are not independent. ΔProb measures the change in the probability of CEO turnover per unit change in the relevant explanatory variables. For indicator variables, the coefficient represents the change in the probability associated with moving the indicator from 0 to 1. Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity. CEO age dummy equals 1 if lagged CEO age is greater than or equal to 60 and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. p-values are in parentheses. Table 12 . Probit regressions of internal CEO turnover for Fortune 500 firms on performance and SOX legislation Probit regression estimates of the likelihood of internal CEO turnover for Fortune 500 firms during the period 1992 to 2005. Internal turnover excludes turnover due to mergers and acquisitions and delistings from a major stock exchange. Occurrences where the CEO is promoted to another CEO position, remains CEO of the delisting firm, is selected for a government position, dies in office, or leaves office due to illness are defined as non-turnover events. The dependent variable equals one if the CEO turnovers and zero otherwise. The SOX dummy equals one for years after 2002. ΔProb measures the change in the probability of CEO turnover per unit change in the relevant explanatory variables. For indicator variables, the coefficient represents the change in the probability associated with moving the indicator from 0 to 1. Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity. CEO age dummy equals 1 if lagged CEO age is greater than or equal to 60 and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. p-values are in parentheses. Multinominal logit regression estimates of the likelihood of no CEO turnover, non-forced CEO turnover and forced CEO turnover for Fortune 500 firms during the period 1992 to 2005. ΔProb measures the change in the probability of the particular choice per unit change in the relevant explanatory variables. For indicator variables, the coefficient represents the change in the probability associated with moving the indicator from 0 to 1. Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity. CEO age dummy equals 1 if lagged CEO age is greater than or equal to 60 and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. p-values are in parentheses.
Unforced Table 14 . Probit regressions of the probability of external CEO turnover on performance Probit regression estimates of the likelihood of external CEO turnover for Fortune 500 firms during the period 1992 to 2005. The dependent variable equals one if the CEO turnovers and zero otherwise. ΔProb measures the change in the probability of CEO turnover per unit change in the relevant explanatory variables. For indicator variables, the coefficient represents the change in the probability associated with moving the indicator from 0 to 1. Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity. CEO age dummy equals 1 if lagged CEO age is greater than or equal to 60 and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. p-values are in parentheses. 
